PROACTIVE PROCUREMENT: USING NEW YORK CITY'S PROCUREMENT RULES TO FOSTER POSITIVE HUMAN SERVICES POLICIES AND SERVE PUBLIC GOALS
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1 For a discussion of the New York City Human Resources Administration's procurement initiatives, see infra Part III.A.2. 2 See, e.g., N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF SMALL BUS. SERVS., NEW YORK CITY WORKFORCE INNO-VATION FUND'S NEW YORK CITY SECTORS INITIATIVE REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS, available at http://www.ppv.org/ppv/pdf_uploads/14_publication.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2006) . 3 See infra note 9. 4 See id. 5 See generally Peter Kunzlik, Making the Market Work for the Environment: Acceptance of (Some) 'Green' Contract Award Criteria in Public Procurement, 15 J. ENVTL. L. 175, 195 (2003) (analyzing a case which upholding "the City of Helsinki's system of awarding points to tenderers whose bus fleets met specified nitrous oxide emissions and noise levels" and rejecting the argument that "environmental criteria could only be adopted if they provided an economic advantage to the authority"); Patrick Flynn, Incentive-A Better Approach to Affirmative Procurement for the Environment, PROCUREMENT LAW., Winter 2002, at 5; N.C. Div. of Pollution Prevention & Envtl. Assistance, Environmentally Preferable Procurement, http://www.p2pays.org/epp/links.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2006) . 6 See, e.g., Press Release, Me. Fair Trade Campaign, Maine Withdraws from Government Procurement Deals in New Trade Agreements (May 20, 2004) , available at http://www.pica.ws/mftc/procurementpressrelease.htm. 7 See, e.g., Small Business Selling to Gov't in N.Y. State, http://www.nylovessmall biz.com/growing_a_business/selling_to_government.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2006) (describing Empire State Development's Division for Small Business' efforts to provide government contracting opportunities to small businesses).
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[Vol. 9:331 thinking differently about procurement rules and about government's role in human services contracting and procurement may help to achieve worthwhile policy goals. Most of the government's provision of social services occurs through procurement of services through contracts with nonprofit organizations; these contracts consume a substantial share of government social services budgets 8 and provide a significant source of income for nonprofit providers. 9 Public procurement involves the purchase of goods or services by the government through contracts with private entities. 10 Many people think of public procurement primarily in terms of the purchase of goods, like asphalt for roadways or paper for offices, but public procurement also involves the purchase of a wide range of services including consultant contracts for architectural, technological, or even military projects; and social services like homeless assistance, job placement, and day and after-school care.
11
Government decisions about the procurement of social services say a lot about its priorities and can have a significant impact on service delivery and civic and community health in both the short-and the long-term. Too often, however, government contracting agencies get caught up in procurement rules that center primarily on ensuring low price, fairness to vendors, and the avoid- 10 See, e.g., PROCUREMENT INDICATORS, supra note 8, at 1. 11 See, e.g., PROCUREMENT INDICATORS, supra note 8, at 6-8 (describing the range of goods and services purchased by the City of New York).
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ance of corruption. Less attention is paid to the substantive quality of programs, procedural protections for third-party clients, and the outcomes associated with various kinds of programs. 12 As the proportion of government services contracted out has increased, concerns have been raised about the dilution or elimination of regulatory oversight and its effect on both the substantive and procedural interests of third-party recipients and the programs' public goals. One way to begin to address those concerns is to ensure that those responsible for procurement remain engaged in and accountable for the services provided, as well as for the overarching public goals associated with the provision of those services.
An engaged and proactive approach to human services procurement that may provide broader lessons for government procurement is beginning to take place in New York City. Small but significant steps are being taken to improve the quality of human services provided through city contracts with private nonprofit organizations in a manner that better serves overarching public policy objectives.
This Article examines recent developments in human services contracting in New York City which, while using elements of the marketplace model, place greater focus on the core public service goals of serving communities most in need with quality and costeffective programs. It focuses on the goals of improving substantive quality and equity in the distribution of such programs and examines the degree to which changes in the human services procurement process to address these goals might also address broader structural and procedural issues involving the privatization of government services.
This Article begins with a brief overview of current legal discourse about public procurement in the context of what is com-12 For example, the New York City Mayor's Office of Contract Services places great emphasis on the time it takes to complete the contracting process, vendor responsibility, and the fiscal implications of contracts with less attention paid to the specifics of programmatic quality or outcomes. press/testimonies/10-06-05_AIDS_Housing_testi-mony%20.pdf (describing audit that revealed the Human Resources Administration's failure to comply with procurement procedures resulted in questionable payments to vendors who failed to provide adequate services).
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[Vol. 9:331 monly called "privatization," noting different theoretical constructs used to help determine the appropriate roles and responsibilities of public and private actors with a particular focus on the provision of human services. Part II provides a summary of the recent history of public procurement in New York City, focusing on changes made with the 1989 Charter Revision and the establishment of the Procurement Policy Board (PPB). This Section also examines the development of New York City's procurement rules, which were initially modeled on private-sector procurement of goods. This Article then discusses the initial awkward application of those same rules to the procurement of human services, which causes many problems, including how to effectively address: (1) the evaluation of cost, quality, and price given variations in the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of nonprofit service providers; (2) the need to tailor programs to meet particular needs while ensuring competition and accountability and avoiding favoritism and corruption; (3) monitoring and evaluation to ensure quality service delivery and fiscal accountability; and (4) issues of governance and control. Part III describes recent New York City procurement initiatives designed to improve the quality and distribution of social services rather than simply contracting out to serve the greatest number of participants at the lowest cost. By utilizing demographic data, information, and input from local communities, government agencies, and nonprofit organizations, several New York City agencies have implemented strategies to ensure that needs-based analysis, outcome measures, cost, and efficiency are all factored into awarding contracts to nonprofits providing human services programs in New York City.
The Article concludes with an examination of the pros and cons of this more engaged and proactive approach, given the various goals of human services procurement from nonprofit entities. It considers whether the treatment of procurement through nonprofit organizations should differ from contracting with for-profit entities. It also explores the degree to which this approach is responsive to broader concerns about excessive "corporatization" of public services to the detriment of civic involvement and democratic governance and the degree to which the approach contrasts with-or reinforces-existing theories of "privatization" (or "publicization") in the context of government contracting.
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I. THEORIES OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: "PRIVATIZATION," "PUBLICIZATION," GOVERNANCE, AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY The discourse on privatization and the appropriate relationships between public and private (including nonprofit) entities reflects a wide variety of perspectives and frameworks. 13 Some view privatization from the perspective of government regulation and responsibility. Others consider privatization from the viewpoint of preserving safeguards for individual recipients of government benefits and maintaining broader democratic norms and values. From any of these perspectives, the privatization debate raises fundamental questions about the role of government versus that of private interests and the relationship between the two.
A. Privatization, the Transition from Regulation to Governance, and the Need for New Accountability Mechanisms
According to Dan Guttman, privatization represents a change in government's oversight role from one of regulation to one of "governance."
14 Guttman discusses different frameworks within which to view the government's role in ensuring accountability in public procurement.
15 He refers to "governance" as "the operative bipartisan political consensus that public purposes are best performed by a mixture of state, market, and civil society actors." 14 In defining "governance" Guttman refers to "the network of public institutions, nonprofit organizations, and private companies that share in the implementation of public policy." Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for Reflection and Choice, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321, 323 n.2 (2004). Guttman views privatization as part of a trend away from government-driven control of public functions and toward a model of public policy and government work driven by government, nonprofit organizations, and private companies working together. Id. at 322-23. Given this trend, the question is how should public law operate in a system of "governance" to ensure public accountability in the performance of public functions. 15 Id. at 324. 16 Id.
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Guttman also observes that existing regulation operates to varying degrees based on the vision of the government's role in an increasingly privatized world.
17
Guttman notes that "governance calls into question the future of the rule of law in the sense of a body of public law that limits those entrusted with public purpose."
18 He goes on to say, however, that the state action doctrine and public procurement law provide the "tools to craft a public law to govern contractors who perform the basic work of government."
19 Governance "does not render public law irrelevant, but provides that it should evolve in keeping with the modern jurisprudential view that social and management science will replace tradition, legal precedent, and natural law as the basis for laws and rules." 20 Thus, although Guttman recognizes the need to view the role of public law differently given the changing roles of public and private entities and the inclusion of both public and private actors in making and carrying out public policy, he seems to believe that existing public law doctrine can adapt to supply sufficient accountability in the face of these changes.
B. Privatization Transforming the Public/Private Distinction
Several administrative law scholars characterize the increased use of contracts with private entities to provide public services as changing the roles and relationships between agencies, the public, and among the various branches of government. 21 These changes, 17 Guttman observes three visions of the government's role. First, the "presumption of regularity/rule of law/public law" vision "presumes that [government] officials have the experience and expertise to oversee and control Government" and thus the capacity to control the procurement process much in the same way that government controls its internal functions. Id. at 324. Second, the "governance/accountability" vision, " [w] hile not forsaking the premise that officials must account for all government work, . . . suggest[s] that the civil service workforce must transform itself into a workforce that functions substantially, or even primarily, to effectively manage third parties." Id. at 324-25. This vision cedes more to the private sector while affirmatively recognizing a need to re-train government actors to ensure their capacity to evaluate the work contracted out. Third, the "muddling through/common law" vision "accepts that rules of public law should apply to those who perform public tasks; the model then applies those rules-on an ad hoc basis-to nongovernmental actors who perform the public's work." Id. at 325. 18 Id. at 357. 19 Id. 20 Id. 21 As Michele Estrin Gilman puts it: As a matter of law, the legal tools that can be used to improve service quality differ radically based on whether the provider is a government agency, for-profit corporation, nonprofit entity, or religious organiza-
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22
Some administrative law scholars seek to identify ways to structure the public/private relationships that result from government outsourcing to address constitutional, separation-of-powers, and regulatory-accountability concerns while still retaining efficiency and flexibility in government contracting. 23 Certainly, there is a need to determine whether and how a middle ground might be found between a notion of privatization as extreme deregulation (and abdication of government responsibility) and concerns about the costs and burdens of over-regulation. At the same time, it is important to articulate in that middle ground a coherent distinction between public and private, recognizing the legal responsibilition. The mission of administrative law is to hold government agencies accountable to the public, given that agencies are not democratically elected bodies. Thus, administrative law centers on limiting agency discretion by enforcing norms of fairness, openness, and judicial review. By contrast, corporate law has never embodied these norms because corporations have never been deemed accountable to the public at large, but rather, only to their own shareholders. In corporate law, accountability comes largely through a fiduciary model. The law governing nonprofits is based on the corporate law model, even though nonprofits do not share the hallmark of ownership interests. This inexact fit is one reason why nonprofits have long faced an accountability challenge. Gilman, supra note 13, at 814-15. 22 24 This is because state action doctrine is inconsistently applied and rarely used to impose constitutional constraints on private actors, 25 and because, when applied, it imposes the full panoply of constitutional requirements on private entities, potentially eliminating the benefits of efficiency and flexibility sought through privatization.
26
Metzger also identifies the limits of regulatory oversight reforms to ensure the full range of protections afforded to private citizens. While she agrees that non-constitutional regulatory reforms are important vehicles for enhancing accountability and guarding against an abuse of power, she argues that they are not sufficient to address concerns about the loss of constitutional protection in a privatized world. 27 Metzger proposes a new private delegation analysis as a way of avoiding the limited availability and "all or nothing" character of state action doctrine as a means of imposing constitutional constraints on privatized government action.
Under a private delegation approach, the key issue becomes not whether private entities wield government power, but rather whether grants of government power to private entities are adequately structured to preserve constitutional accountability. Provided that alternative mechanisms exist to ensure that government power ultimately stays within constitutional limits, exercises of government power by constitutionally immune private actors do not present constitutional concerns. This approach secures constitutional accountability by ensuring that individuals are able to enforce constitutional limits on government power; but it also grants government more flexibility by allowing 24 Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, supra note 23. 25 A notable example of the failure of state action doctrine-or any doctrine for that matter-to impose constitutional constraints in the context of public procurement of social services is evident in Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). There, the plaintiff claimed that the Salvation Army, a nonprofit religious organization under contract with various New York City agencies to provide foster care and other social services, diverted public dollars to support the Salvation Army Church and required its employees to "promote the unique spirit of Salvationism in social services." Id. at 230. The district court dismissed the complaint alleging Establishment Clause, Equal Protection, and civil rights violations under the New York Constitution, finding that the Salvation Army did not engage in state action. Id. at 255. 26 See Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, supra note 23, at 1421-27. 27 Id. at 1452.
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choices of how best to preserve constitutional limits to be made by the political branches in the first instance.
28
Metzger notes "that nonconstitutional accountability mechanisms can adequately address the constitutional concerns that private delegations might otherwise create."
29 Thus, under a private delegation approach, the existence of oversight and accountability measures in private contracting may approximate constitutional requirements, such as due process and fairness in the allocation of government benefits or services. To achieve a private delegation structure that targets the kinds of delegations specific to privatization (without sweeping in every form of government interaction with private parties), 30 Metzger invokes principles of "agency."
31
Her proposed private delegation structure asks whether grants of government power to private entities as "agents" of government are structured to preserve constitutional as well as regulatory accountability.
32
Paul Verkuil asserts the need to structure privatized government to preserve government control over core government functions, including policymaking and other "inherent functions."
33
Verkuil examines the public-private distinction with respect to the Fifth Amendment's "public use" requirement, which limits government "takings" of private property; tests, including "public function," to determine when private parties may be treated as state actors; and the use of the "public interest" test as a limit on regulation. 34 While noting the limitations of the various tests used to draw the public-private distinction, Verkuil argues that the recognition of public (versus private) authority is essential, specifically in the context of outsourcing government services and responsibili- 28 Id. at 1456. 29 Id. at 1457. 30 Id. at 1462. 31 Id. at 1463-64. 32 Id. at 1464. 33 Verkuil explains:
To decide if privatization has reached its limits, we must know whether "inherent functions" of government are being delegated. It may be no easier to locate these functions than it was to determine what businesses are affected with a public interest, what private actions are public functions, or what property transfers amount to public use. But the inquiry cannot be avoided. Certain exercises of public authority in the liberal state must be performed by government. These duties are nondelegable, or at least not delegable without continuing governmental oversight. The public-private distinction still has a role to play in locating limits on the transfer of political power to private hands. Verkuil, supra note 13, at 420-21. 34 Id. at 407-15.
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NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:331 ties. 35 With respect to public contracting on the federal level, Verkuil refers to the federal Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Circular A-76 process. This process requires that competitive outsourcing involve private vendors, but it "permits government services to be outsourced only after a review process and makes 'inherent' government functions ineligible to be outsourced at all."
36 Notwithstanding this and other limitations, Verkuil notes that much government contracting is not subject to the limitations of Circular A-76. 37 Specifically, he observes the lack of reflection or concern about the degree to which such outsourcing involves "inherent" government functions and the fundamental problems this creates.
38 Verkuil cites single-source military contracting with private vendors in the Iraq war as a particularly egregious example of government going too far in the direction of privatizing government services, including "inherent government functions," with vir- 35 Id. at 420-21. 36 Id. at 437. Among the non-delegable functions outlined in Circular A-76 are the following "inherently governmental" activities:
(1) Binding the United States to take or not to take some action by contract, policy, regulation, authorization, order, or otherwise; (2) Determining, protecting, and advancing economic, political, territorial, property, or other interests by military or diplomatic action, civil or criminal judicial proceedings, contract management, or otherwise; (3) Significantly affecting the life, liberty, or property of private persons; or (4) Exerting ultimate control over the acquisition, use, or disposition of United States property (real or personal, tangible or intangible), including establishing policies or procedures for the collection, control or disbursement of appropriated and other federal funds. Id. at 438 (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR A-76, at A-2, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/ a076/a76_incl_tech_correction.pdf). 37 Id. at 441. Verkuil specifically cites procurement in the Department of Defense (DOD), which, he says is "by far the largest government contracting agency." Id. Noting that a large percentage of DOD contracts are for services, some of which "potentially involve significant or inherent functions of government," and that many of these services are not subject to competitive bidding and thus not within the constraints of Circular A-76, Verkuil characterizes private contracting in connection with the war in Iraq as "either an outsourcing nightmare or a bonanza depending on whether you are the government or the private contractor." Id. 38 Id. at 441-42. Verkuil goes on to note the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison as an example of out-of-control outsourcing: "private contractors were employed as interrogators . . . . By any measure . . . interrogation of prisoners should qualify as an inherently governmental function. Interrogation involves 'military action and matters significantly affecting life, liberty, and property.' " Id. While Verkuil does not assert private contracting alone was responsible for Abu Ghraib, he presents it as a particularly compelling example of the need for both clear limitations on the kinds of public functions that may be outsourced and effective oversight of government contracts. Id.
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tually no oversight or control.
39
Verkuil contrasts the Department of Defense's extreme and unchecked reliance on private contractors in the Iraq war with the Transportation Security Administration's replacement of private contractors with government employees for airport security after September 11, 2001, focusing on the question of "inherent" government authority:
The arguments in favor of federal employees turned on the issue of what functions should be inherently governmental. Proponents emphasized that since government was responsible for security functions (e.g., FBI, CIA, Border Patrol, and INS), Congress should not privatize airport security because '[l]aw enforcement is a proper function of the federal government.' While that proposition may state matters too broadly (private security guards are sometimes employed by government), it does highlight the essential role of government when it comes to the use of force. The presence of a badge, much like the requirement of an oath, is an indicator of government authority and control. 40 Verkuil uses these and other examples to emphasize the importance of "connecting the distinction between public and private to who runs the government and for what reasons" and protecting the public by placing some functions beyond the reach of privatization. Thus, in re-examining and re-framing the public/private distinction in the context of privatization, both Metzger and Verkuil argue for the preservation and indeed reinforcement of public law norms, values, and protections in an environment of increasing and often unchecked (or inadequately checked) privatization of government services and responsibilities. But giving the public sector independent value means more than limiting privatization's extension into "inherent" functions: It means assuring that private entities providing government services do so consistent with not only the particular job to be performed but also with public law norms.
C. Nonprofits: Public, Private, or Both?
Another question that arises is whether the public/private distinction should take on a different dimension in the context of nonprofit organizations, which ostensibly exist to perform a public function-a pre-requisite to their corporate and tax-exempt status. As Martha Minow has noted:
The case of non-profits exemplifies the critical approach to the public/private distinction, for the critic would challenge the idea that any nonprofit is "private," given its reliance on a governmentally-determined tax-exempt status and tax deductions for donations, which economists would view as a public subsidy. 42 From this perspective, it may be argued that privatization ought to be viewed through a different lens when the private contractor is a nonprofit rather than a for-profit entity. 43 For example, Miriam Galston addresses privatization involving nonprofits from the perspective of the role nonprofits play in supporting civic renewal. 44 She considers the ways in which nonprofits contribute to the "public law" goals of civic involvement and civic public sector is given independent value, the private sector benefits from clearer rules and better oversight. Our tradition of political liberalism keeps the public sector from usurping the essential role of private enterprise. But our notions of civil society require that the public enterprise operate effectively as well. Verkuil, supra note 13, at 467. 42 
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PROACTIVE PROCUREMENT 343 renewal. Galston offers four perspectives on how nonprofits contribute to civic participation. The first is a cooperation perspective, in which nonprofits working in communities are viewed as enhancing relationships of trust among community members; minimizing the need for detailed rules or contracts to engage in mutually beneficial interactions; and achieving community-wide goals through cooperation. 45 Another perspective focuses on self-governance, emphasizing the role of nonprofits in enabling community members to be involved in decisions affecting how they live. 46 The third is a representative-institution perspective, which posits that nonprofits enhance civic health by mediating relationships with representative institutions and strengthening democratic practices and values. 47 Finally, the community-morality perspective views nonprofits as promoting and enhancing notions of community morality by fostering the acceptance of a core set of moral norms and a sense of obligation to the self and the community.
48
Galston articulates various ways in which nonprofits participate in fostering civic goals. She also discusses the tensions among these perspectives and how they have affected civic renewal advocates' view of the role of the public contracting process and tax policy vis à vis nonprofit entities. Galston notes the limited degree to which voluntary associations can fulfill the goals of civic renewal from the various perspectives discussed. Even in "those areas in which associations can make meaningful contributions to civic life, different types of organizations and organizational activities are likely to result in distinct, sometimes competing civic impacts." 49 There are limitations inherent in any legal regime's attempt to improve civil society or further social goals.
50
Each of the constructs Galston sets forth carries the expectation that nonprofit entities play an important role in supporting civic renewal by actively fostering public participation and enhancing democratic values while engaging in their primary substantive work. Galston envisions nonprofits not so much as private entities, but more like quasi-public entities that bear some responsibility for fostering civic goals.
Notwithstanding the quasi-public role attributed to nonprofits, often the same considerations come into play in the discussion of
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51
Metzger seems to view private delegation in the same terms regardless of whether the private contractor is a for-or nonprofit entity.
52
For Metzger, the focus is on the existence of appropriate oversight mechanisms to ensure that the delegation remains within constitutional and regulatory boundaries. 53 In general, this is the right approach. The question is whether the nature and sufficiency of contractual oversight mechanisms might differ between nonprofits providing human services with a public service mission versus forprofits providing fungible goods and services with a profit-making goal. This question is not often explored closely, perhaps because the perceived differences between for-profit and nonprofit entities amount to less than meets the eye. It is also a question that tends to go beyond the core focus of policy discussions about the values and drawbacks of privatization.
D. Privatization or "Publicization?"
Generally the discourse on privatization pits the interests in more efficient, cost-effective, and responsive service provision against concerns about the loss of procedural and substantive safeguards and democratic accountability. 54 On one side, proponents of privatization view public procurement through the lens of economic efficiency 55 or, in more ideological terms, "shrinking gov-51 As Martha Minow notes: From the perspective of people with needs-children to educate, housing crises, joblessness, alcoholism or drug abuse-religious and secular nonprofit organizations exist alongside for-profit companies and governments as potential resources. Both kinds of entities do, or should, abide by the same basic rules and do, or should, pursue overlapping, if not identical, purposes. Yet determining and enforcing those basic rules remains centrally a public task, to be pursued according to democratic means and purposes even while seeking efficiencies. Minow, supra note 13, at 1257. 52 See id. at 1091-92. 53 Id. 54 See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 22, at 228 ("When government decisions affect individual rights, political accountability provides additional checks on abuses of the government's coercive powers. Because private contractors are not politically accountable, I would argue that they should be subject to greater constraints when making decisions affecting such rights."). 55 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 22, at 170 ("Because the case for privatization has sounded largely in the language of cost savings and, to some extent increased effectiveness, demonstrating whether these gains will in fact obtain has become both politically and practically important to the privatization movement. Those who support privatization on such instrumental, rather than ideological, grounds are advocates of what one scholar calls 'pragmatic privatization.").
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56
These proponents tend to pay little heed to distinctions between for-profit and nonprofit providers or concerns about governance or public law norms; indeed they often see regulatory and constitutional concerns as obstacles to efficiency. 57 On the other side are those concerned with the preservation of public law norms, such as constitutional and regulatory requirements, public accountability, and civic participation in the context of privatization.
58 Is there a way of viewing human services contracting outside of these traditional privatization camps?
In her article Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 59 Jody Freeman takes a different view of privatization, one that is particularly apt in the context of the human services procurement with nonprofit entities: "Instead of seeing privatization as a means of shrinking government, . . . imagine it as a mechanism for expanding government's reach into realms traditionally thought private." 60 In other words, she says, what is called "privatization" can be seen as a means of "publicization."
61
The idea that public procurement in the human services context is more akin to "publicization" than "privatization" may resonate with the experience of nonprofit organizations and government entities engaged in providing human services through government contracts. Nonprofits, facing many layers of regulation-from charities regulation to regulation based on their service areas-may see government procurement of human services as a form of "publicization" rather than privatization. 62 This view of 56 See John Forrer & James Edwin Kee, Public Servants as Contract Managers, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 361, 362 (2004) ("The crusade for shrinking government employment took firm hold at the end of the last century and continues into the 21st century with no flagging in sight . . . . For decades, advocates of privatization . . . have been assailing the poor performance of government workers and extolling the virtues of private sector management. That view-some label it an ideology-has gained converts to the idea that the private sector is preferred to the public sector when it comes to the efficient provision of goods and services."). 57 See generally Forrer & Kee, supra note 56, at 363-64. 58 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 22, at 175 ("[C]ontracting out presents serious and complicated questions about the rationality, public participation, openness, and accountability of publicly funded and privately conferred services-concerns that are likely to be important to administrative law scholars and not easily assuaged."). 59 public procurement can highlight both opportunities for proactive policymaking and the inclusion of democratic ideals in the public contracting process as well as the limitations on the ability to achieve broad public policy and public law goals through procurement. The process of designing public procurement and establishing the rules for soliciting bids or proposals is structured in a way which incorporates administrative law norms of public notice, opportunity to participate, and avenues for addressing perceived procedural irregularities vis à vis proposed vendors and contracting agencies. This process may be viewed as "publicization" of nonprofits engaged in the public procurement process. Perhaps more significantly, government agencies exercise oversight to maintain integrity in the selection process and ensure fiscal and legal accountability in public contracts. Such policing is more in accord with the fiscal accountability and corruption control goals of privatization than program quality or public law concerns.
The question is whether, in the context of human services procurement, anti-corruption and fiscal accountability goals can be met by more than just policing government agencies and nonprofit providers. Applying a substantive notion of "publicization," to what extent can the procurement process be used to foster qualitative policy goals? More specifically, is it possible to make the process of public contracting-from contractor solicitation and selection to contract development, monitoring, and evaluationinvolve more than just ensuring that the competitive, fiscal, and anti-corruption goals of privatization are being met? Given the differences between the contracting model of governance and traditional notions of agency regulation, as well as the strictures imposed on public procurement, to what extent can the procurement process be used proactively to better serve public policy goals from both substantive and governance perspectives? To place the discussion of procurement in concrete terms, this Article will look specifically at the public procurement experience in New York City-a city with a huge public procurement budget which addresses procurement on a "local" level. It will consider human services procurement innovations initiated by various New York City agencies aimed at addressing issues of substantive program quality, as well as need-based, equitable service provision. This Article will also assess the degree to which such innovations might address not only particular programmatic concerns, but also some of the concerns about public accountability raised in the context of private delegation or "publicization."
II. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND NEW YORK CITY'S EXPERIENCE
By dollar value, the vast scale of New York City procurement exceeds that of all but a handful of states.
A. Recent History of Procurement in New York City
Public procurement is the process for the government's purchase of goods and services from the private and not-for-profit sectors. 64 The procurement process applies not only to "hard" commodities like paper or asphalt, but also to the provision of human services provided primarily through contracts with nonprofit entities. 65 Procurement is an essential component of government efforts to privatize the provision of certain goods and services, and it has been the subject of much attention and debate since the surge in interest in "reinventing government" that began in the 1980s and 1990s and continues today. 66 Procurement is a fundamental function of government and a concrete expression of governmental goals and priorities.
Day by day, year by year, the most fundamental decisions that American governments make involve which services to provide and who should bear the costs of those services. As Justice Ken- 64 See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 163(2)(c) (McKinney 2006) . 65 See PROCUREMENT INDICATORS, supra note 8, at 5. 66 As Guttman observes:
In the 1980s and 1990s, the notion of shrinking Government gained popular support around the globe. Citizens, however, generally wanted small Government without diminution in governmental functions. To address this inconsistency, new strategies for reform took hold at home and abroad under banners touting "reinventing government," "publicprivate partnerships," "devolution," "privatization," and "deregulation." These strategies sought to make Government more responsive and efficient by engaging non-government actors in its functions. The Federal Government embraced the new strategies with little regard for the fact that they had long been adopted. Guttman, supra note 14, at 329. See also Forrer & Kee, supra note 56, at 363 ("In the United States, 'reinventing Government' became the buzzword for reforming and improving the efficiency of government programs. In many cases, however, the bottomline translation meant replacing government workers with attractive retirement and health benefits with less-expensive private sector workers with less worker benefits.").
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67
New York City provides a particularly interesting local example because of relatively recent revisions to the City Charter that changed the city government structure and resulted in significant changes to the procurement process. It also provides an interesting case study because it provides an example of high volume procurement within a local context.
68
The process of public procurement in New York City has undergone several transformations and continues to be a subject of evolution and reform. New York City's current procurement rules exist pursuant to the New York City Charter 69 and Procurement Policy Board Rules. 70 The Procurement Policy Board (PPB) was established as part of a series of significant Charter Revision reforms in 1989, The 1986 New York City Parking Violations Bureau (PVB) scandals reinforced distrust of and opposition to non-competitively bid contracts. The PVB used the sole-source exception to competitive bidding to award sweetheart contracts for collecting parking fines to companies with connections to top PVB officials and Democratic Party bosses, Donald Manes and Stanley Friedman. Even when competitive bids were sought by the PVB, the process was corruptly manipulated. The City's contract for hand-held computers was "fixed" for Citisource, the firm in which Stanley Friedman was the controlling shareholder . . . . The media and reformers blasted the contracting process that permitted officials to bypass or manipulate the competitive bidding system . . . . . . . . When the corruption scandals erupted in 1986, the Charter Revision Commission, appointed several years earlier to redesign City gov-well as a successful legal challenge to the structure of the City's Board of Estimate, which was held to violate the "one-person, onevote" requirement. 73 Thus, the new procurement rules were developed with an eye toward corruption control 74 and accountability in the context of broader governance changes. These changes raised questions of representation, including adequate minority representation; 75 the ernment, was already well into its deliberations about the future structure of City government. According to one of the principle drafters, the charter's new procurement systems were shaped primarily in reaction to the corruption scandals. 74 See Anechiarico & Jacobs, supra note 72, at 143-44 ("The whole public contracting process, its law and administration, is significantly affected by the goals of preventing corruption and, more recently, even the appearance of corruption . . . . The dilemma is that in trying to corruption-proof public contracting, corruption controllers mire the process in red tape, undermining the government's capacity to carry out essential goals and, ironically, creating new opportunities for corruption and fraud."). 75 Indeed, the issue of minority representation figured rather prominently in the deliberations regarding the re-structuring of New York City government in the wake of the Board of Estimate's demise. See . 2) , supra note 67, at 778 (noting concerns about minority representation during the 1989 Charter Revision). For example, the structure of the City Council as a unicameral fifty-one member body was said to be based largely on concerns about minority representation: "Our own choice of a unicameral body consisting of fifty-one single member districts reflected several goals: (1) to enhance minority opportunities to elect candidates of their own choice; (2) to increase minority membership (and minorityparty membership); . . . and (4) to increase constituent responsiveness by decreasing the size of each district." Id. at 786.
In the increasingly "privatized" world that followed the 1989 restructuring, the
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[Vol. 9:331 appropriate allocation of centralized versus localized power; 76 and increased government efficiency and fiscal accountability. This discussion took place within the constraints of existing state law requirements regarding procurement and governance. 77 One of the major changes in the procurement structure following the demise of the Board of Estimate was to place control over procurement in the hands of the Mayor rather than in a legislative or quasi-legislative body. 78 The Charter Revision Commission was persuaded by the view of then-State Comptroller Edward Regan that [contracting] is an administrative function if ever there was one. It ought to be placed with the administrator . . . . Richard Ravitch had reached the same conclusion in 1988, listing as one of his proposals for a new government: "[To] hold the mayor clearly accountable for the procurement activities and decisions of the administration while subjecting the process to checks and balances which do not diffuse responsibility." 79 As a result, the responsibility for contracting was placed at the Commissioner level, with certain contracts subject to approval by the mayor or a designated deputy mayor. Both state and local law govern the City's procurement practice. Of primary importance is Article 5-A of the General Municipal Law (GML), which contains the basic procurement instruction to all municipalities. Specifically, GML § 103 requires all municipalities to award all (1) contracts for public works and (2) all purchase (i.e., goods or commodities) contracts over a specified minimum amount through competitive sealed bid after public advertisement to the lowest responsible bidder . . . . GML § 104-b instructs municipalities to adopt policies and procedures for alternative methods of procurement-those procurement processes other than competitive sealed bidding-so that contracts are let in a manner to assure prudent and economical use of public funds in the best interest of taxpayers, to obtain maximum quality at lowest possible cost under the circumstances and to guard against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, fraud and corruption.
Id.
78 Schwarz & Lane, Charter Making (pt. 2), supra note 67, at 885. 79 Id. at 885-86. 80 Id. at 888.
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ding, a level playing field, and a transparent process-applied not only to the purchase of "hard" goods and services like the ticketing machines that were the subject of the PVB scandals, 81 but also to contracts with nonprofits for human services such as after-school, senior, and summer youth services. 82 The drafters of the new Charter and PPB Rules recognized that different procedures might be applicable to human services contracts, but felt constrained by state law to apply a competitive sealed bidding process to all procurement.
83
B. Procurement Reform and Reinvented Government?
Many observers viewed the procurement changes in the Charter revision as a major step in placing New York City at the vanguard of government "reinvention."
84 While these changes were taking place, Osborne and Gaebler's Reinventing Government was all the rage, and there was much focus on the privatization of government services as the key to better and cheaper services. 85 Some proponents of privatization were motivated by ideological goals that included shrinking government and shifting responsibility from government to private hands. This, despite Osborne and Gaebler's characterization of privatization in technocratic rather than ideological terms and their admonition that privatization does not shift the ultimate responsibility for services away from government. 86 As Osborne and Gaebler noted: Privatization is one arrow in government's quiver. But just as obviously, privatization is not the solution. Those who advocate it on ideological grounds-because they believe business is always superior to government-are selling the American people snake oil . . . . . . . . It makes sense to put the delivery of many public services in private hands (whether for-profit or nonprofit), if by doing so a government can get more effectiveness, efficiency, equity, or accountability. But we
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[Vol. 9:331 Yet as noted above, privatization is having a significant impact in transforming the structure of government, including the degree of responsibility for failures in service provision, due process, equitable distribution, and more. At the time of New York's procurement restructuring, little attention was paid to the manner in which privatization might transform the structure of government or the distinctions between competitive bidding for goods and services by nonprofits versus for-profits. 87 While the structural changes in the Board of Estimate's duties took into consideration the appropriate roles of the executive and legislative branches and considered issues such as representation and accountability generally, less attention was paid to the overall impact of increased "private delegation" 88 through procurement. This may be because New York City had long been involved in contracting out for goods and services so the debate centered not on whether to contract out, but rather on who in government would be responsible for management, oversight, cost effectiveness, and minimizing corruption.
The procurement rules were designed primarily with the procurement of goods and easily quantifiable services. 89 The goals of public procurement were consistently presented in market and technocratic terms as ensuring the purchase of optimal goods and services at the best prices through competition and efficient oversight. 90 The view that public procurement ought to mirror the prishould not mistake this for some grand ideology of privatizing government. When governments contract with private businesses, both conservatives and liberals often talk as if they are shifting a fundamental public responsibility to the private sector. This is nonsense: they are shifting the delivery of services, not the responsibility for services. OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 85, at 45, 47. See also DAVID OSBORNE & PETER PLAS-TRIK, BANISHING BUREAUCRACY: THE FIVE STRATEGIES FOR REINVENTING GOVERNMENT (1997) . 87 These distinctions were not completely ignored in the context of procurement reform. For example, the PPB Rules explicitly preferred requests for proposals for human services contracts. See N.Y. CITY, N.Y., PROCUREMENT POL'Y BD. RULES, tit. 9, § 1-01(e) (defining "client services") and § 3-01(c) (indicating preference for requests for proposals method of source selection for client services contracts) (2003) . 88 See Metzger, Changing Shape, supra note 23, at 1437-38 and accompanying text. 89 The explicit preference in state law and in the City Charter for competitive sealed bidding evidences this emphasis on market-type goods and services. 90 Much of the reporting on procurement is focused on obtaining tax-dollar value based on a market model of competition in which contracting entities are viewed as "business partners" and economic engines:
[A]gencies must strive to achieve the best value and to ensure that our business partners are responsible, from the standpoint of business integ-vate sector procurement's focus on a market model of competition is still central. 91 Other goals of public procurement include transparent and fair procedures, public input and oversight, and the prevention of corruption and favoritism.
92 Also, as noted earlier, anti-corruption goals figured prominently in New York City procurement reform.
93
C. Current Procurement Policies
While the market-centered view still holds in many quarters, the City Charter 94 and PPB Rules 95 allow for fundamental differences in the procurement of human services, as opposed to goods and other municipal services such as sanitation. The practice in some New York City agencies has evolved to recognize and respond to these differences. Unlike many contracts for goods, human services contracts should not be structured simply to go to the lowest bidder. The more particularized range of needs in human services contracting require a flexible approach consistent enough to ensure both fair competition and substantive, qualitative accountability mechanisms.
To address some of these concerns, provisions in the PPB Rules for human services contracts state a preference for Requests for Proposals (RFPs) for such contracts. 96 Even with RFPs for human services contracts, however, the emphasis is on procedural rity, financial capacity and performance ability. Agencies must also treat such business partners fairly, recognizing that City procurement represents an important opportunity for economic development and business growth in New York City and the surrounding region. PROCUREMENT INDICATORS, supra note 8, at 1. 91 See id. 92 For example, the Mayor's Office of Contract Services issued a report noting the opportunities for notice and input in the contracting process and delineating the steps taken to avoid corruption in the award and administration of contracts. Id. at 1. 93 See Anechiarico & Jacobs, supra note 72. 94 New York City Charter § 319 states:
[P]roposals may be solicited through a request for proposals with award to the responsible offeror whose proposal is determined to be the most advantageous to the city, taking into consideration the price and such other factors or criteria as are set forth in the request for proposals. No other factors or criteria shall be used in the evaluation and award of the contract except those specified in the request for proposals. Discussions may be conducted with responsible offerors who submit proposals, provided that offerors shall be accorded fair treatment with respect to any opportunity for discussion and revision of the proposals. procurement provisions of the Charter and Rules could become little more than procedural safeguards for vendors and bureaucratic obstacles for nonprofits, increasing the cost of service provision without adding the kind of value ultimately sought through public contracting for human services. 109 If procurement rules are applied narrowly to serve only the goals of preventing fraud and corruption, getting the lowest price, and providing fairness in contractor selection, contracting agencies can lose sight of the substantive goals of the contract and the related public policy objectives.
110
Yet agency officials often feel constrained by procurement rules' focus on bidding procedures to achieve low price and fair selection methods.
111
In response to the actual and perceived limitations imposed by procurement rules, many city agency heads have focused largely on a private sector or "market" model of procurement, which uses competition to reduce costs within a procedural framework designed to ensure fairness to vendors and the avoidance of corruption. 112 While there are many useful lessons that can be taken from this model, the core goals of public procurement of human services should focus on the public benefits to be provided. These include obtaining quality services responsive to community needs in a manner that comports with public law norms and democratic principles of participation. Too much emphasis on a marketbased, vendor-focused procedural approach can obscure the overarching public purpose behind the procurement of these services and may go too far in absolving government actors of their responthe lack of flexibility in New York City's procurement system and outlining proposed changes). 109 See, e.g., Robert Jackson, Chair, N.Y. City Council Comm. on Contracts, Oversight: Addressing Retroactive Human Services Contracts (Jan. 22, 2003), http:// webdocs.nyccouncil.info/attachments/56073.htm (characterizing the human services procurement process as slow, bureaucratic, and burdensome). 110 For example, as Commissioner Mullgrav noted in her remarks during this Symposium, the pro forma renewal of youth services contracts with no attention paid to demographic shifts or to changes in need rendered the services less effective and less able to meet broad public objectives than they might have been. See Jeanne B. Mullgrav, Government Gets in the Game: Strategic Philanthropy Isn't Just for Foundations Anymore, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 295, 298 (2006) . 111 In addition to the rules requirements are the more general restrictions on using procurement to advance certain kinds of policy objectives. For a more extensive discussion about limits on using procurement as a means of expressing opposition to apartheid and to promote or discourage other policies, see infra note 119 and accompanying text. 112 It is notable that the Mayor's Office of Contract Services, the city's procurement oversight agency, places a great deal of focus on numbers, timing, and vendor responsibility. See generally PROCUREMENT INDICATORS, supra note 8.
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113 Experience has also shown that, left unchecked or unexamined, even what began as a sound procurement process can result in services going disproportionately to individuals and communities favored by the market and political influence rather than those in greatest need. 114 In the process, both government agencies and nonprofit providers may lose sight of broader public purposes. To the extent that the procurement process can be designed to focus on core public purposes-including quality service provision; broad access for eligible communities; equitable, need-based distribution of services; and efficiency and cost effectiveness-these important goals must continually be factored into the human services procurement process-and perhaps into all government procurement efforts.
To accomplish these objectives, government officials engaged in human services procurement should take proactive steps focused on core public purposes like improving short-and long-term outcomes and ensuring equitable distribution of services rather than simply responding passively to procurement rules focused exclusively on market-competition, low price, and the avoidance of corruption. Procedural and substantive protections must flow not only to vendors, but also to the specific clients for whom the services are being provided and to the general public, which has an interest in understanding how government dollars are being spent. This is why approaches to public procurement which focus on fostering public policy goals as they relate to both the clients for whom the services exist and to the public are so important. Most creative procurement policymaking work takes place in the framing of the contracts themselves, which starts with the pre-solicitation review and requests for proposals processes through contract monitoring and evaluation. 115 Indeed, much debate and innovation is taking place in the context of setting the initial criteria for
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122
Such efforts to foster positive public goals through procurement should be encouraged, not stifled, particularly where there is general consensus in support and where the impact on cost or the availability of quality services is minimal. Apart from injecting broad social policy goals into the procurement process, the question is how can RFP and contract design-as well as monitoring and evaluation-improve the quality of human services contracts? Fairness to vendors and the avoidance of corruption are important goals in public procurement. A more important consideration, however, is ensuring that (1) inherent governmental functions are not shifted to private actors; (2) public goals are met; and (3) public law norms and protections are not diluted or lost through privatization.
III. PROACTIVE PROCUREMENT: STRUCTURING HUMAN SERVICES PROCUREMENT TO BEST SERVE CORE PUBLIC GOALS OF SUBSTANTIVE QUALITY, MEANINGFUL OUTCOMES, AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF SERVICES
Rather than approach the PPB Rules as restrictive and limiting, some agencies are identifying ways in which the contract solici- 
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tation and drafting processes may be structured to serve broader policy goals consistent with the agency mission, focusing not only on vendors but the ultimate clients as well. For example, a number of city human services agencies have undertaken to compile and use current demographic and other data when designing contract solicitations to assess and target services to areas of greatest need. Several city human services agencies have moved toward performance-based contracting, placing greater emphasis on the outcomes sought and on the degree to which those outcomes are addressed through public contracts. 123 These approaches, though modest, may provide examples of a more engaged procurement approach that begins to get at some of the concerns about the absence of public goals and public law norms in privatization.
A. Structuring the Solicitation and Designing the Contract
Planning for Equity and Accountability: Using Current Demographic and Population Data to Target Programs Based on Need and Evaluate Outcomes
One way in which city agencies have begun to think about their contracting plans is to make better use of demographic and other data to target services where most needed, and to help ensure equity in the distribution of services (or at least coverage in areas of highest need) while also providing a basis for assessing outcomes and providing accountability.
Beginning agencies-are placing greater emphasis on the quality of the contract services provided by measuring the outcomes achieved. Some agencies use "performance-based contracting," which ties the achievement of outcomes to compensation under the contracts.
133
This focus on the substantive quality of programs and on outcomes one is to shift services, expand services to the areas of greatest unmet need, . . . [a]nd to bring our services down in age. To target the underserved age groups and particularly in the near term to begin to serve two year olds more and work downward from there. And our second objective is to maximize resources. We want to modify our contracting process so that contracts reflect actual enrollment history and to enable programs to accept contracts and vouchers and encourage them to accept contracts and vouchers simultaneously to maximize enrollment and to provide greater access to families who have vouchers into our contracted system. Id. at 12. 131 133 See SMITH & GRINKER, supra note 123, at 9. A performance-based contract "builds on performance management techniques, but adds the critical factor of financial incentives that reward organizations for good performance and sometimes penalize them for failing to achieve outcomes. As with performance measurement and management, the focus of performance-based contracting can be on inputs, activities, outputs, or outcomes. 
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[Vol. 9:331 should involve macro considerations about the relationships between government and private actors as well as micro considerations about how, on a very practical level, to conduct effective monitoring and evaluation. This gets at fundamental questions about fiscal accountability and fraud prevention and considers improving substantive service quality. Of course, the value of contract monitoring and evaluation to achieve substantive improvement depends entirely on the content of the contract, since the requirements and expectations it contains define the parameters of agency monitoring. 146 There is a lot of room in section 4-01 of the PPB Rules for contract design and evaluation criteria and monitoring mechanisms that increase the quality of the services provided. With respect to human services contracts-for things like homeless services, employment programs, and day care-there is room to make contract monitoring and evaluation fit a substantive "publicization" model. As noted above, several New York City agencies have begun to re-think monitoring and evaluation from a substantive standpoint as requiring more than just counting heads and following dollars. 147 Some might not think contract monitoring and evaluation can be given more substance. 148 With increased emphasis on the need to monitor for legal and fiscal accountability as well as the avoidance of corruption, favoritism, and self-dealing in light of seemingly ever-present revelations of irregularities and waste when government services are privatized, the emphasis in contract monitoring will likely remain on fiscal regularity and corruption control. 149 Moreover, many contracting agencies currently find it difficult to do any meaningful contract monitoring at all given limitations on resources, staff, and adequately trained evaluators. 150 It therefore may seem unrealistic to propose that government contracting agencies monitor and evaluate human services contracts in a more substantive, qualitative way.
If policy makers re-think monitoring for basic fiscal and programmatic regularity to streamline, centralize, and avoid duplication and consider other, more participatory evaluation models, it may be possible to implement substantive evaluation that fosters the goal of improving service quality.
Given the multiple ways in which nonprofits providing human services are regulated, monitored, and evaluated, there are certainly opportunities for government agencies to work collaboratively to centralize and streamline basic oversight and accountability reporting. For example, other presenters at this Symposium have discussed the attorney general's role in monitoring nonprofits in New York State and the regulatory burden they face. 151 Contracting agencies should consider the extent to which existing regulatory requirements duplicate city procurement requirements and whether there are ways of centralizing certain aspects of oversight to reduce the burden on both agencies and nonprofits.
Some New York City human services contracting agencies are moving in this direction as they streamline and coordinate community-based services. 152 We are working on creating a single assessment mechanism across all the programs. And a single protocol for how we do it, including cross-agency teams for doing that. 153 In looking at substantive policy issues in the evaluation context, it should be noted that in most cases of human services contracting, the service provision goals of the government agency and the nonprofit are aligned. 154 Often the best monitors are clients, community members, other nonprofits, and foundations. At times, it may be helpful to subcontract for a professional evaluator with expertise in the particular program area. If those responsible for public procurement move away from a vision of privatization that views government's role as no more than an arm's-length fiscal policeman, they may begin to see opportunities for more coordinated, textured, and qualitative monitoring without dramatically increasing either the workload of city agency personnel or the regulatory burden on nonprofit organizations. This can be done through approaches that include elements of the traditional market model with a more participatory, two-way approach to evaluation.
For example, as noted in an article in the American Journal of Evaluation about what is called an "insourcing" model of evaluation:
